UK tribunal forces government to admit it issued Apple a secret encryption order

The UK's Investigatory Powers Tribunal has rejected the government's attempt to keep secret the existence of an order served on Apple. Until now, the government's position was that it would neither confirm nor deny whether it had issued Apple a Technical Capability Notice (TCN). TCNs are secret orders issued under Section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which lets the government require technology companies to change their services to facilitate investigatory powers. The Tribunal has now ruled that the government must acknowledge it issued Apple such a notice.
The background, as the article tells it: in February 2025 the Washington Post exposed that the government had ordered Apple to provide 'backdoor' access to encrypted iCloud data belonging to users in the UK and around the world. The order was reportedly issued in January 2025. Rather than weaken its security, Apple withdrew Advanced Data Protection (ADP), an optional feature that extends end-to-end encryption to additional categories of iCloud data, from new UK users. Apple also said it would not build a backdoor or master key into any of its products or services, without referring publicly to the TCN, which it was forbidden to do.
The original order potentially implicated the encrypted data of Apple customers worldwide, including in the United States. After months of diplomatic wrangling involving the Trump administration, the UK government withdrew that notice, then issued a second TCN, reportedly restricted to British users. Apple's original legal challenge was dismissed after the first notice was withdrawn, so the company launched a fresh challenge in 2026.
At a hearing on 17 September this year, lawyers for the civil rights organisations Liberty and Privacy International challenged the government's silence. Ben Jaffey KC, representing them, argued that the secrecy had become increasingly difficult to justify, comparing it to the 'emperor's new clothes' and saying it 'brings the administration of justice into disrepute'. The existence of the order was already public knowledge, he said, and pretending otherwise obstructed proper consideration of the legal challenge. The government replied that dropping its neither-confirm-nor-deny policy could damage national security by helping hostile actors build a picture of which companies had received such notices.
The Tribunal rejected that argument. As Reuters reports, it concluded that the government 'has not established that it would be damaging to national security to reveal in these proceedings, as is the case, that the respondent has given Apple a Technical Capability Notice.'
The limits are clear. The Tribunal has not ruled the underlying order unlawful, has not determined whether the government can legitimately require Apple to change its encryption, and has not disclosed the notice's technical requirements. The government has lost only an argument about keeping the proceedings secret.
The article also describes the 'two-tier' effect of Apple's move. Users who enabled ADP before the withdrawal have not been required to turn it off; the article cites Apple's security documentation saying its servers cannot modify the ADP setting or roll it back on a user's behalf. New UK users cannot enable it. Liberty and Privacy International are challenging the lawfulness, necessity and secrecy of the TCN regime, arguing it lacks adequate safeguards and threatens fundamental rights. Their case and Apple's are proceeding alongside one another, with a substantive hearing expected sometime in 2027.
Key facts
- The Investigatory Powers Tribunal ruled that the UK government must acknowledge it issued Apple a Technical Capability Notice, rejecting its neither-confirm-nor-deny position.
- The government argued that disclosure could help hostile actors map which companies received notices; the Tribunal said it had not established that this would damage national security.
- The ruling covers secrecy of the proceedings only: it does not rule the order unlawful or reveal its technical requirements.
- The original order was reportedly issued in January 2025; it was later withdrawn and replaced by a second notice, reportedly limited to British users.
- Apple withdrew Advanced Data Protection from new UK users in February 2025; the Liberty and Privacy International case and Apple's own challenge are heading to a substantive hearing expected in 2027.
Why it matters
A government demanded changes to the security of devices used by millions of people, barred the maker from discussing the demand, and then would not admit the demand existed. The Tribunal has now broken the last part of that, even though the order's existence had already been widely reported. The article calls it a major defeat for the government's secrecy and says it makes public scrutiny of the dispute more possible. Because Section 253 powers can potentially be applied to other communications and technology providers, the author asks what happens when the next notice targets a different service, encryption system or category of data, and how customers would ever find out.
Who it affects
Apple and its UK customers are directly involved: new UK users cannot enable Advanced Data Protection, while those who enabled it earlier keep it. The original order potentially implicated the encrypted data of Apple customers worldwide, including in the United States. Liberty and Privacy International are the challengers. Any technology company could in principle receive a TCN, and companies that do can be legally prohibited from saying so.
How to use it
This is a legal development rather than a product, so there is nothing to switch on. For iCloud users, the practical facts in the article are these: Advanced Data Protection extends end-to-end encryption to additional categories of iCloud data, so that even Apple cannot decrypt them. Apple already encrypts some iCloud categories without it, but some of those remain accessible to Apple and can potentially be provided in response to valid legal demands. UK users who enabled ADP before the February 2025 withdrawal have not been required to turn it off. Watch for the substantive hearing expected in 2027.
How solid is it
The core fact, that the Tribunal ordered the government to acknowledge the notice, is a court ruling, and the article quotes the Tribunal's wording as reported by Reuters. The piece itself is a commentary on macanorak.com, and the author is not named in the text. The January 2025 date of the original order and the restriction of the second notice to British users are both described as 'reportedly'. The calendar date of the ruling is not given; the article says only 'today'.
Risks and caveats
The decision is narrow. The Tribunal has not ruled the underlying order unlawful, has not decided whether the government can require Apple to change its encryption, and has not disclosed the notice's technical requirements. What the second notice demands of Apple is not stated. No response from Apple or the UK government to the ruling is quoted, and the article does not say whether the government will appeal. The government's stated position is that these powers are necessary to support lawful investigations and protect public safety. The author's own guess is that we are still some distance from understanding what the government wants Apple to do and whether it has the legal authority to demand it.
“The respondent has not established that it would be damaging to national security to reveal in these proceedings, as is the case, that the respondent has given Apple a Technical Capability Notice.”
— The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, as reported by Reuters