Nvidia's security team: what did it know about Megaspeed and Huang?

Nvidia's security team: what did it know about Megaspeed and Huang?

TechCrunch looks at an open question around Nvidia's security function. In August, Nvidia's longtime chief security officer, David Reber, stepped down. Just two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang himself left the company over growing questions about his extramarital relationships. Those began with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China, and then widened to reports about two separate affairs with Nvidia employees. Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing.

Reber, who spent four years as CSO and seven at Nvidia overall, said at the time that he was leaving for health reasons. In a late-August LinkedIn post he wrote, "This wasn’t a pivot I had planned. But I know what needs to come first: family and health," and disclosed that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson's more than two years earlier. His replacement, Saša Zdjelar, previously spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager, then one year at Salesforce and several years at the cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Neither Zdjelar nor Reber responded to TechCrunch's questions on Thursday, and Nvidia has not answered related questions either.

The author is explicit that nothing public connects Reber's or Zdjelar's role changes to the Megaspeed matter. The point is that it seems fair to ask what the security team knew about the government's scrutiny of Megaspeed and about Huang's relationships, and whether anyone raised concerns. Relationships between a CEO and employees typically fall to HR, legal and the board, not security. But security specialists say any affair, even one inside the office, can give a foreign intelligence service leverage over an executive who wants it kept quiet. Huang's relationship with an executive at Megaspeed, a company under federal investigation, was not an office matter at all.

Some people inside Nvidia clearly knew parts of the picture. The New York Times reported earlier this week that Nvidia's top lawyer was engaged with the government's Megaspeed inquiry more than a year ago; Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials. The Times also cited five Nvidia employees who said Huang was involved with a vice president who reported directly to him, and Reuters, citing two people, later reported a second relationship. The author notes that this suggests colleagues knew, even if the behavior is not expressly forbidden by Nvidia's code of conduct. What is unclear is whether any of it reached security.

The piece leans on Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals and who wrote Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics in 2020. He says intelligence services gather information largely through everyday conversation rather than hacking, which makes risks hard for security teams to spot. Even when a team does spot them, resources are limited: security is often underfunded because, unlike some other cost centers, it does not drive revenue. It is astonishingly common, he says, for CEOs to answer a security team's warnings with "not a nickel more than compliance."

Many companies also define security too narrowly, specialists say. In an opinion piece in The Hill, Don Aviv, CEO of the corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz wrote that "Too many companies still approach security primarily as a matter of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats." They argued that security teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts. TechCrunch adds that it would be surprising if Nvidia's security team didn't have a more expansive remit than most companies, given its scale and business partners, but it's possible.

In fairness, the article says, some of this is beyond what any team can do. Speaking generally, not about Huang, Eftimiades offered a hypothetical: a CEO says he can't do something because "I'm fighting a board who doesn't want to do this." That tells an intelligence asset who the obstacle is, and the service then asks who the sticking point is and looks for ways into that person's email and phone. What a rival intelligence service wants, Eftimiades says, is often less technology than policy insight, such as who is pushing to change export rules and who the biggest blocker is. He says the playbook is not new, "particularly for China," and that what is newer compared with Soviet-era spying is that the relationships these services cultivate now often last years, not weeks.

Technology can augment that human intelligence, he says, pointing to IMSI catchers, devices that mimic a cell tower so nearby phones connect to them. A basic version can cost about $1,000 and fit in a suitcase, though government-grade models cost far more, and a couple of Chinese espionage cases last year involved them. Eftimiades says no one knows yet whether such devices were used against Huang, whose phone was presumably hardened so that compromises could be detected, if not stopped altogether. What Nvidia's security team knew, and whether it could have acted, will only become clearer as the board's independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed. Eftimiades hopes the episode is "a wake-up call" for U.S. industry, which he calls mostly "clueless" about China's tactics. His own guess is that "We have lost trillions [of dollars] in intellectual property," and he adds: "Whatever we think we’re doing isn’t working."

Key facts

  • CSO David Reber (four years as CSO, seven at Nvidia) stepped down in August citing health reasons; CEO Jensen Huang left the company two and a half months later over questions about his extramarital relationships.
  • The relationships began with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company U.S. investigators suspect of funneling Nvidia chips to China, then widened to reports of two affairs with Nvidia employees. Megaspeed denies wrongdoing.
  • Nothing public links Reber's or his replacement Saša Zdjelar's role changes to Megaspeed; Nvidia, Reber and Zdjelar did not answer TechCrunch's questions about what security knew.
  • Former intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades says services collect information through everyday conversation, security teams are often underfunded, and CEOs often offer 'not a nickel more than compliance'.
  • The board's independent investigation and federal inquiries are expected to clarify what the security team knew and whether it could have acted.

Why it matters

Nvidia chips are at the center of U.S. concern about diversion to China, and the Megaspeed inquiry touches the company's own leadership. TechCrunch's question is whether the people responsible for protecting Nvidia from foreign intelligence interest saw any of it coming. Eftimiades argues that a CEO's private relationships can hand a foreign service leverage, and that rival services often want policy insight, such as who is pushing to change export rules and who the biggest blocker is, more than technology.

Who it affects

Nvidia, its board and its security leadership, whose role in the episode is unclear. More broadly, corporate security teams and the executives who set their budgets and scope. Eftimiades says U.S. industry is mostly 'clueless' about China's tactics, and that any executive dealing with the country will say they have been approached.

How to use it

The article reads as a checklist of questions for any company. Aviv and Hurewitz argue that security teams should look beyond facilities, cyberattacks and physical threats to insider threats: the cultivation of executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest and attempts to get sensitive information through trusted personal contacts. Eftimiades adds that resourcing is part of the problem, since security teams are often underfunded because they do not drive revenue.

How solid is it

This is reporting framed as a question, not a finding. TechCrunch states that nothing public connects the security leadership changes to the Megaspeed matter, and gives no evidence that the security team knew anything. Facts about Huang's relationships and the Megaspeed inquiry are attributed to The New York Times (five Nvidia employees; the top lawyer's engagement more than a year ago) and Reuters (two people, a second relationship). Eftimiades is a single expert voice; his 'trillions' of dollars in lost intellectual property is his own guess, and his hypothetical about a CEO and a board was explicitly not about Huang.

Risks and caveats

Reber said he left for health reasons, and the article does not say otherwise. Nvidia, Reber and Zdjelar did not answer questions, so the security team's side is missing. No evidence is given that any foreign intelligence service targeted Huang or that IMSI catchers were used against him; Eftimiades says no one knows yet. Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing. The article notes that an affair between a CEO and employees would normally go to HR, legal and the board rather than security, and that some of this may be beyond what any team can do. Answers depend on the board's independent investigation and federal inquiries, and the source gives no timeline for either.

“Whatever we think we’re doing isn’t working.”

— Nicholas Eftimiades, retired senior intelligence officer, quoted by TechCrunch